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INTRODUCTION
There is approximately $1.33 trillion invested in hedge funds
worldwide.' Most of this money is invested in legitimate hedge funds,2
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Fordham University School of Law; M.B.A., Wharton School of
Business, 1995; M.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1993; B.S. United States Merchant
Marine Academy, 1985. Derivatives structurer and marketer (1995 - 2008). I would like
to thank Professor Squire for guiding me through the writing process and helping me
consider alternatives to my arguments. I would also like to thank and acknowledge
Professor James Jalil, Scott Dubowsky Esq., Steve Nelson Esq., Ric Fouad Esq., and John
Liu Ph.D for listening to my ideas and offering their comments and insights.
1. lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Hennesee Settles SEC's Bayou Charges, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 23, 2009, at C10.
2. TAMAR FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
REGULATION 160 (2d ed. 2003) ("[T]he term hedge fund is undefined, including in the
federal securities laws ... hedge fund has developed into a catch-all classification for
many unregistered privately managed pools of capital."); see also Press Release, Office
of Sen. Grassley, Grassley and Levin Introduce Hedge Fund Transparency Bill (Jan. 29,
2009), available at http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=30748 1.
Hedge funds are simply private investment funds in which the investors have agreed
to pool their money under the control of an investment manager. What distinguishes
them from other investment funds is that hedge funds are typically open only to
"qualified purchasers," an SEC term referring to institutional investors like pension
funds and wealthy individuals with assets over a specified minimum amount. In
addition, most hedge funds have one hundred or fewer beneficial owners. By limiting
the number of their beneficial owners and accepting funds only from investors of
means, hedge funds have been able to qualify for the statutory exclusions provided in
Sections 80a-3(c)(1) and (7) of the Investment Company Act, and avoid the obligation
to comply with that law's statutory and regulatory requirements. In short, hedge funds
have been able to operate outside the reach of the SEC.
Id.; see also William Fung & David A. Hsieh, A Primer on Hedge Funds, 6 J.
EMPIRICAL FIN. 309, 309 (1999) ("[Hedge funds] are typically organized as limited
partnerships, in which the investors are limited partners and the managers are general
partners. As general partners, the fund managers usually invest in a significant portion
of their personal wealth into the partnership to ensure the alignment of economic
interests among the partners.").
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with honest managers. In the last decade, however, some significant
frauds have been uncovered. Unscrupulous hedge fund managers such
as Samuel Israel, Michael Lauer, Paul Greenwood, Kirk Wright, James
Nicholson and others have defrauded investors of billions of dollars.'
These frauds, coupled with the current financial crisis, have brought
intense scrutiny to the hedge fund industry.4 Legislators have responded
by introducing three bills in Congress that would generally compel
hedge funds to register with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC"). 5 These bills would also impose new dis-
closure and recordkeeping requirements on hedge funds.6 Similarly, in
June 2009, President Obama released his Administration's proposal to
reform the regulation of the financial industry, which includes a
provision for fund advisers to register with the SEC under the
Investment Adviser Act, and also subject hedge funds to extensive
recordkeeping and disclosure requirements.7 The politicians that intro-
duced these proposals claim that registration and the attending
disclosures of hedge funds will protect investors and deter fraud.8
3. Steve Stecklow, In Echoes of Madoff Ponzi Cases Proliferate, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 28, 2009, at A 1; Steve Stecklow, Pair Lived Large on Fraud, U.S. Says, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 26, 2009, at Al; Christine Williamson, A Better Way to Hedge Against Fraud,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 1, 2008, available at http://www.pionline.com/
article/20080901/PR1NTSUB/309019975 (It is estimated that $9 billion has been lost in
the past decade due to hedge fund fraud.).
4. Interview with James Jalil, Partner, Thompson Hine, in New York, N.Y. (May
28, 2009).
5. Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act, H.R. 711, 111th Cong. (2009); Hedge
Fund Transparency Act, S. 344, 111 th Cong. (2009); Private Fund Transparency Act, S.
1276, 111 th Cong. (2009).
6. Id.
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM-A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 3-4 (2009)
[hereinafter FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM].
8. Id. at 2 ("We must build a new foundation for financial regulation and
supervision that is simpler and more effectively enforced, that protects consumers and
investors . . . "); Press Release, Office of Rep. Castle, Capuano, Castle Bill Would
Improve Oversight of Hedge Funds (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://www.house.gov/
capuano/news/2009/prO12709.shtm (Representative Capruano: "In addition to pro-
viding us with basic census information on hedge funds, this measure can be used to
detect and deter fraudulent practice and risky behavior before it's too late."); Press
Release, Office of Sen. Grassley, supra note 2 (Senator Levin: "The Hedge Fund
Transparency Act will protect investors, and it will help protect our financial system.");
Press Release, Office of Sen. Reed, Floor Statement Introducing the Private Fund
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This Note will discuss some of the non-market risks that hedge fund
investors are exposed to, explore some current hedge fund frauds, and
discuss whether disclosure 9 is really the most effective way to deter
fraud in the hedge fund industry. The Note will conclude by proposing
that third party custody of hedge fund assets would be the most effective
deterrent against hedge fund fraud.
I. NON-MARKET RISKS FOR HEDGE FUND INVESTORS
Investors generally expect investments in hedge funds to be
riskier 0 than investment in mutual funds or similar registered
investment companies, and thus, deliver superior performance. " That is
Transparency Act of 2009 (June 16, 2009), available at http://reed.senate.gov/
newsroom/details.cfm?id=316702 (Senator Reed: "these statutory changes will help
modernize our outdated financial regulatory system, protect investors and prevent
fraud").
9. See Div. OF INV. MGMT. & OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, INSPECTIONS &
EXAMINATIONS, SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS iv (2003)
[hereinafter IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS] ("Because hedge funds
are not registered investment companies, they generally are not required to meet
prescribed disclosure requirements."). If any of the bills or President Obama's
Regulatory Reform become statutes, hedge funds will be subject to extensive disclosure
requirements. See Hedge Fund Transparency Act, S. 344, 11 1th Cong. (2009); Hedge
Fund Adviser Registration Act, H.R. 711, 111 th Cong. (2009); Private Fund
Transparency Act, S. 1276, 111 th Cong. (2009).
10. FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 2, at 161 ("Hedge funds are not subject to
borrowing or leverage restrictions that apply to registered investment companies.
Moreover hedge funds are not subject to the diversification requirements imposed on
registered investment companies and therefore may concentrate their portfolio in a
handful of investments thereby increasing their potential exposure to market
fluctuation."); Press Release, Office of Sen. Grassley, supra note 2 ("The compensation
system employed by most hedge funds encourages risk taking. Typically, investors
agree to pay hedge fund investment managers a management fee of 2 percent of the
fund's total assets, plus 20 percent of the fund's profits. The hedge fund managers
profit enormously if the fund does well, but due to the guaranteed management fee, get
a hefty payment even when the fund underperforms or fails."); PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 5 (1999) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON
FINANCIAL MARKETS], available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/
hedgfund.pdf ("Hedge funds' use of leverage, combined with any structured or illiquid
positions whose full value cannot be realized in a quick sale, can potentially make them
somewhat fragile institutions that are vulnerable to liquidity shocks.").
11. FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 2, at 159 (An investment of $100,000 with the
Quantum Fund, a hedge fund managed by George Soros, in 1969, would be worth $314
2009
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presumeably why hedge fund investors typically agree to pay a fee
based on assets under management (1 to 2%), and to a performance fee
(usually 20%) based on the hedge fund's annual returns. 12 In addition,
hedge fund investors agree to commit their funds for an extended period,
in some cases as long as two years.' 3 However, most investors do not
expect to be exposed to several types of non-market risk stemming from
the fraudulent conduct of hedge fund managers. These include fictitious
performance disclosure, looting, inflated asset valuation, and conflicts of
interests. 14
A. Fictitious Fund Performance Disclosure
Fund managers provide frequent disclosure documents to their
investors: monthly newsletters, account statements, quarterly perfor-
mance reports, investor calls and annual financial statements. 5
Prospective hedge fund investors are usually given marketing materials
that detail the hedge fund's strategy and include data such as fund
performance on a monthly, annual and since-inception basis.6 Most
hedge funds hire an independent accountant to audit this fund
performance data. 17
Unscrupulous hedge fund managers engage in fictitious disclosure
statements to investors to hide trading losses, cover-up looting, or as part
of a Ponzi scheme. 18 For example, a hedge fund manager can enter non-
million in 2003); PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note
10, at 3 ("[R]ecent studies of hedge fund performance have generally found that hedge
funds as a group offer greater returns, yet greater risk, than investment benchmarks such
as the Standard and Poor's S&P 500 stock index.").
12. FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 2, at 161.
13. Id.; IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 9, at ix
("Hedge funds typically agree to repurchase their own interests from investors on a
limited, periodic basis, such as quarterly, often following an initial "lock-up period"
during which time investors are not permitted to liquidate their investments"); see also
Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS BuS. L.J.
323,327 (2007).
14. See infra Parts II.A-II.F.
15. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 9, at 46; Interview
with John C. Liu, Director of Public Equities, Indiana Public Employees' Retirement
Fund (Aug. 24, 2009) (on file with Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law).
16. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 9, at 46.
17. See id. at 57-59.
18. A Ponzi is an "investment swindle in which high profits are promised from
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existent profitable trades in his trading software (or enhance real
trades),' 9 aggregate these trades with real unprofitable trades (or in some
cases no trades), 20 and thereby create the illusion of a profitable monthly
trading performance. This fictitious superior performance would then be
disclosed to current and prospective investors in order to attract new
21investors, prevent current investors from making an informed decision
(i.e. to stay in the fund or withdraw),22 and enable the hedge fund
manager to pay himself a hefty performance bonus at year's end.23
Managers who want to show investors audited financials have
another hurdle to clear when trying to release fictitious trading
performance data, but they can still engage in a variety of fraudulent
schemes. For example, they can create their own accounting firm to
audit the fund's financials;2 4 forge audited financials and represent that
they come from a real accountant; 25 provide an honest accountant with
fictitious sources and early investors are paid off with funds raised from later ones."
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1364 (4th ed.
2000); see infra Part II.
19. See Saul Hansell, Big Japanese Bank Says Trader Lost $1.1 Billion on Deals in
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1995, at Al (False trades representing $330 million in
fictitious profits were entered into Kidder, Peabody & Co.'s computers by Joseph Jett,
the head of its government bond trading unit, over a two-year period.).
20. See Nicholas Bray & Michael Sesit, Barings Was Warned Controls Were Lax
But Didn't Make Reforms in Singapore, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1995, at A3 (trader
entered fictitious offsetting trades to make it appear that his real trades were hedged);
see also David Gow, SocGen Rogue Trader May Have Had Accomplice, Says Internal
Inquiry, GUARDIAN, May 24, 2008, at 36 (stating that fictitious trades were entered into
trading software by rogue trader to disguise his suspect positions).
21. Interview with John C. Liu, supra note 15 (Institutional investors look at
several factors in order to evaluate an investment in a hedge fund. These factors
include the recent performance history of the fund and performance of the fund over an
entire market cycle.).
22. Id. (When hedge fund managers fictitiously enhance their returns, investors
that would have left due to the poor returns by the fund could now be compelled to stay
in the fund.).
23. See Complaint at 33, Comm. v. Bayou Group, LLC, No. 06 Civ. 2379
(S.D.N.Y Mar. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Committee Complaint].
24. Id. at 30.
25. See Complaint at 37, SEC v. Nicholson, No. 09 Civ. 1748 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 25,
2009) [hereinafter Nicholson Complaint].
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fictitious trading data with forged brokerage reports to back it up;2 6 or
hire a small auditor who is unduly influenced by the manager.27
B. Looting
Looting occurs when a manager transfers cash from the hedge fund
to his personal account or third parties for personal expenses. 28 This is
usually followed by fictitious disclosure statements to conceal the
fraudulent looting. 29 Looting is accomplished in various ways, the most
obvious being when a manager wires money out of the hedge fund into
his personal bank account and flees the country.30 There are, however,
more subtle examples of looting. For example, a manager could purport
to borrow from the fund by signing a promissory note.3' The
promissory note is then entered as an asset on the hedge fund's balance
sheet, although it will probably never be repaid by the unscrupulous
hedge fund manager. Even if the manager genuinely believes that he
will be able to repay the loan when his outstanding trading generates
huge incentive fees, the investors' assets have been looted.
Another subtle looting issue arises from fictitious disclosures to
investors. Most hedge funds charge investors a 20% performance fee
based on the fund's annual returns.32 Managers that artificially enhance
their returns through fictitious trading can therefore earn huge
performance based bonuses.
33
26. See Complaint at 31, SEC v. K.L. Group, No. 05 Civ. 80186 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2,
2005) [hereinafter KL Complaint].
27. See A.C. Thompson & Jake Bernstein, Toothless Watchdogs? Auditing the
Audit Firms, BARRON'S, May 11, 2009, at 24 (small auditors who earn a significant
portion of their annual income from a fund manager might be less willing to do a
thorough audit).
28. Zachery Kouwe, 2 Money Managers Held in New Wall St. Fraud Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, at B5.
29. Id.
30. Julie Creswell, Paradise and Money Lost, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at § 3.
31. See Kouwe, supra note 28.
32. FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 2, at 161.
33. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Samuel Israel III, Daniel E. Marino,
Bayou Management, and Bayou for Defrauding Hedge Fund Investors and
Misappropriating Investor Assets (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2005-139.htm.
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C. Inflated Valuations ofAssets
A more subtle hedge fund fraud occurs when hedge fund managers
intentionally mismark the value of their hedge fund's assets to inflate its
net asset value ("NAV") 34 and performance.
Fraudulent hedge fund managers inflate their fund's NAV in
various ways. For example, a hedge fund manager can purchase illiquid
stocks and inflate their prices through manipulative trading practices.
Following the period in which the manager reports his fund's
performance, the manager can purchase blocks of illiquid stocks at
steadily increasing prices, thus raising the closing price of the particular
stock. The stock's inflated closing price is then used to mark the asset to
market, 35 which increases the hedge fund's NAV. A manager could also
tout these illiquid stocks in blogs and other public media with the intent
to persuade other investors to buy them and raise the price.36
Hedge fund managers desiring to inflate their fund's NAV can also
invest in asset classes that are inherently difficult to value: stock in
34. Net asset value (NAV) is computed by taking the market value at the time of all
portfolio securities, adding the value of other assets and subtracting liabilities. United
States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 548 (1973). The net asset value per share (NAV) is
computed by dividing the NAV by the number of shares outstanding. Id.
35. Mark-to-market is the discipline of periodically valuing assets at current market
prices. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 10, at 4.
36. SEC, Microcap Stock: A Guide for Investors, http://www.sec.gov/investor/
pubs/microcapstock.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2009) ("Fraudsters often use aliases on
Internet bulletin boards and chat rooms to hide their identities and post messages urging
investors to buy stock in microcap companies based on supposedly 'inside' information
about impending developments at the companies."). See also Investopedia.com, Pump
and Dump, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pumpanddump.asp.
A scheme that attempts to boost the price of a stock through recommendations based
on false, misleading or greatly exaggerated statements. The perpetrators of this
scheme, who already have an established position in the company's stock, sell their
positions after the hype has led to a higher share price. This practice is illegal based
on securities law and can lead to heavy fines. The victims of this scheme will often
lose a considerable amount of their investment as the stock often falls back down after
the process is complete.
Id. See generally David Kesmodel, Whole Foods Is Hot, Wild Oats a Dud-So Said
'Rahodeb', WALL ST. J., July 12, 2007, at Al (An example of using blogs to influence
stock prices is discussed in this article. Rahodeb was the online pseudonym of John
Mackey co-founder and chief executive of Whole Foods Market Inc. After Rahodeb
made disparaging remarks and outlandish predictions that Wild Oats stock would fall
below $5 a share on Internet message boards, Whole Foods Market Inc. agreed to buy
Wild Oats for $565 million, or $18.50 a share.).
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privately-held companies, complex structured products3 7 and exotic
derivatives.38 These difficult to value investments are marked at prices
unjustified by the fundamentals of the investment. Managers will often
use unrealistic projections for the pricing models to justify their
valuations. Even the value of simpler derivative products, such as over-
the-counter ("OTC") equity options, can be inflated by inputting overly
aggressive volatility values 39 into a commonly used pricing model, such
as the Black-Scholes pricing model.40 Whichever scheme the manager
chooses, the hedge fund's disclosed, audited NAV is significantly higher
than its actual value.
D. Conflicts of Interest
Hedge fund managers can place their personal interest ahead of
their investors in myriad ways. Managers can assume risks that maxi-
mize their expected compensation but are inappropriate for their
investors. 4 ' Furthermore, the hedge fund managers can engage in un-
37. Structured Products are "investment[s] made up of a portfolio of securities and
derivatives. A structured product can be customized by the investor, and since payoffs
and components vary and contain no standards from product to product, an investor
must acknowledge the risk in these investments." Investorwords.com, Structured
Product, http://www.investorwords.com/6938/structuredproduct.html (last visited Oct.
17, 2009).
38. "Exotic derivatives may take many forms. One example is a derivative created
by mixing and matching option and forward contracts and whose payoff is a
complicated function of one or many underlying securities. For example, a binary
option might pay $10 million if, before a specified date, one of the three largest banks
in Indonesia has defaulted on its debt." Luciana Aquino-Hagedom, Is There a Future in
Obtaining and Leveraging Derivatives Patents?, 125 BANKING L.J. 365, 369 (2008).
39. Shaev v. Hampel, No. 99 Civ. 10578, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20497, at *20
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2002) ("The Proxy Statement explicitly warns stockholders that the
Black-Scholes calculations are estimates, and that the values derived are dependent
upon certain (enumerated) assumptions.").
40. The Black-Scholes Option Pricing Method is a common option-pricing method
first developed in 1973 by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes. Martino-Catt v. E.I.
Dupont de Nemours, No. 4-02-CV-90500, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25743, at *5 n.3 (S.D
Iowa Feb. 20, 2002). The Black-Scholes pricing model takes into account stock price,
expiration date, risk-free rate of return, and stock volatility relative to the marketplace.
Id. at *8. As is true with all forward looking statements it is inherently speculative. Id.
at **6-13.
41. Press Release, Office of Sen. Grassley, supra note 2 ("Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM) was a hedge fund that, at its peak, had more than $125 billion in
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scrupulous and illegal trading practices that place their interest ahead of
their investors: front running;42 cross trading;43 aggregation; 44 or un-
fairly allocating profitable trades, 45 among other practices. Additionally,
hedge fund managers can execute the majority of their fund's trades
with a broker owned or affiliated with the manager with the intent to
chum,4 6 and/or pay inflated commission.47 Other conflicts of interest
assets under management and, due to massive borrowing, a total market position of
roughly $1.3 trillion.").
42. Front running occurs when a manager executes an order on a security for his
own account prior to executing a significantly larger order on the same security for the
fund. The order for the fund will predictably affect the price of the security, and the
manager could expect to close out his position at a profit. See SEC v. Pasternak, 561 F.
Supp. 2d 459, 481, 503, 507 (D.N.J. 2008).
43. Cross trading is a practice that occurs when a broker executes both a buy and a
sell for the same security from one client account to another where both accounts are
managed by the same portfolio manager. "Typically, this is yet another way for a broker
to rip you off. When the trade doesn't get recorded through the exchange, there is a
good chance that one client didn't get the best price." Investopedia.com, Cross Trade,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/crosstrade.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
44. See In re Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1387,
51 S.E.C. 715 (Oct. 20, 1993) (Kemper aggregated trades and then allocated the
execution price in order to benefit certain clients over others. Section 17(d) of the
Investment Company Act and Rule 17d-l(a) prohibit fraudulent practices in connection
with aggregated trades in which an investment company and affiliated persons of the
investment company participate.).
45. In re Walker Inv. Manager, Inc., 52 S.E.C. 865 (1996) (An example of unfair
allocations of profitable trades is discussed in this proceeding. Walker, an investment
manager, had approximately 33 accounts with over $300 million in assets under
management. Walker favored performance-based fee clients when allocating profitable
equity trades, a practice he failed to disclose to his clients.).
46. "Churning refers to the excessive buying and selling of securities in your
account by your broker, for the purpose of generating commissions and without regard
to your investment objectives. Churning can be a violation of SEC Rule 15cl-7 and
other securities laws." SEC, Churning http://www.sec.gov/answers/chuming.htm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2009). See also I.R.C. § 1 (2006) (Not only does unnecessary trading
generate significant commissions for the broker to the detriment of the investor, but
assuming that the trades are profitable it also creates short term gains that are taxed as
ordinary income to the investor. Under the current United States federal tax system,
positions held for more than one year would be treated as capital gains with a
significantly better tax treatment.).
47. In re Bayou Group, LLC, 39 B.R. 810, 822 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Bayou
Securities was wholly owned by Israel and was used to execute the vast majority of the
trades done by the Bayou Group's hedge funds, also managed by Israel. In 2003, Bayou
Securities earned an estimated $29 million in trading commissions, while the Bayou
Funds with possibly $400 million in assets lost an estimated $49 million.).
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include the employment of small auditors who derive a significant
income from the manager48 and soft dollar commissions.
II. HEDGE FUND FRAUDS
Samuel Israel-The Bayou Group
(Disclosure, Looting & Conflicts of Interest)
Samuel Israel III came from a wealthy family and worked at
various Wall Street firms during the 1980s and early 1990s, including
the prestigious multibillion-dollar Omega hedge fund.5  In June 1996,
he founded the Bayou Group and opened his first hedge fund, the Bayou
Fund.5 His Wall Street pedigree and charm, coupled with a low
threshold for an initial investment and the absence of a customary
48. See Thompson & Bernstein, supra note 27. See also Complaint at 22,
Romberger v. Irwin, No. 09-01266 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2009) (alleging that the fraud
could not have been perpetrated without the reckless and or negligent actions of the
fund's accountant).
49. Soft dollars is an arrangement under which products or services other than the
execution of securities transactions are obtained by a manager from a broker-dealer in
exchange for using that broker to execute trades. During routine inspections of advisers
and broker-dealers, the SEC has found the following examples of products or services
acquired: advisers using soft dollars to pay for office rent and equipment, cellular phone
services and personal expenses, advisers using soft dollars to pay an employee's salary,
an adviser using soft dollars to pay for advisory client referrals and marketing expenses,
an adviser using soft dollars to pay legal expenses, hotel and rental car costs and to
install a phone system, and an unregistered hedge fund adviser using soft dollars to pay
for personal travel, entertainment, limousine, interior design and construction expenses.
Registered Investment Companies generally comply with the limitations detailed in
Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but hedge funds, which are
generally not registered, are not subject to the limitations of Section 28(e) and thus the
client commissions are not necessarily used for the direct benefit of the client. See
generally OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, SEC, INSPECTION
REPORT ON THE SOFT DOLLAR PRACTICES OF BROKER-DEALERS, INVESTMENT ADVISERS
AND MUTUAL FUNDS (1998).
50. Nelson D. Schwartz & Abha Bhattarai, The Search for a Missing Trader Goes
Global, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2008, at Cl (According to former colleagues, Israel
exaggerated his role at Omega. Rather than being a head trader, he was more of an
administrator.).
51. Committee Complaint, supra note 23, at 2 1.
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management fee, most likely attracted his initial investors.5 2  Israel
eventually added several other hedge funds to his Bayou Group. Over
time his consistently low risk and high market returns 53 attracted an
estimated $450 million from investors.54  Israel traded these assets
through accounts maintained by Bayou Securities, a broker-dealer
owned by Mr. Israel. 55 Bayou Securities was registered with the SEC
and was a member of the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD"). 56
Following its first year of trading, Israel's hedge fund failed to meet
its profit targets. Israel then concealed his poor trading performance by
transferring trading commissions paid to Bayou Securities back to the
Bayou Fund. As a result, both current and potential investors were
misled into thinking that Israel had a strong trading performance that
year.57 His trading performance continued to decline and in 1998 the
Bayou Fund sustained millions of dollars in losses.5 8 To cover up these
losses Israel created fictitious trading statements and reports for his
investors with the help of his Chief Financial Officer, Daniel Marino.59
Israel used this false trading performance to create fake annual financial
statements. 60 Aware that he could not deceive an independent auditor
with these false financial statements, Israel dismissed the fund's
accounting firm and hired a fictitious accounting firm, Richmond-
Fairfield Associates.61 Israel created this fictitious firm, and its sole
principal was Marino. It purported to prepare "independent" audit
reports that validated Bayou's financials.62
From 1999 until the firm's closing in 2005, the Bayou hedge funds
continued to lose money.63 Israel concealed these losses by issuing
newsletters, monthly account statements, quarterly reports and annual
52. Amanda Cantrell, What Happened at Bayou, CNNMONEY, Sept. 29, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/09/29/markets/bayou investors/index.htm.
53. Committee Complaint, supra note 23, at 23.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 15, 24.
56. Id. at 11.
57. Id. at 28.
58. Id. at 29.
59. Committee Complaint, supra note 23, at 29.
60. Id. at 30.
61. In re Bayou Group, LLC, 39 B.R. 810, 822 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
62. Id.
63. Committee Complaint, supra note 23, at 31.
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financials that falsely claimed that the funds were profitable. 64 These
reports were then validated by Richmond-Fairfield Associates'
"independent" audits.
65
In addition to losing investors' money through poor trading, Israel
looted the fund through two mechanisms. First, he traded extensively.
The majority of these trades were executed by Bayou Securities, earning
him hefty commissions.66 For example, in 2003 Bayou Securities
earned an estimated $29 million in commissions, which were distributed
to Israel as salary and profits.67 Second, Israel withdrew substantial
annual performance fees based on his fictitious trading performance.68
By 2004, Israel was unable to garner enough cash from new
investors to balance cash outflows from his hedge fund's trading losses,
commissions, and performance fees. 69 At this point, Israel stopped
trading, liquidated the hedge funds, and transferred the cash to various
personal bank accounts.7y In July 2005, Israel informed his investors
that Bayou was closing and that they would receive 100% of their
investment, yet his investors had still received nothing by August
2005,71 and the SEC caught on to the scheme.1
2
Greenwood & Walsh- Westridge Capital
(Disclosure, Looting & Conflicts of Interest)
Messrs. Greenwood and Walsh became famous in the 1980s by
devising a computerized trading program called Shark that allowed
traders to spot trading opportunities in various assets. 73 They parlayed
this fame, as supposed Wall Street wizards, into their Westridge Capital
venture. They solicited institutional investors by promising to invest
their money in an "enhanced equity indexing" strategy.74  This was
64. In re Bayou Group LLC, 39 B.R. at 822.
65. Committee Complaint, supra note 23, at 30-3 1.
66. Id. at 33.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 34.
69. Motion for Judgment by Plaintiffs at C, In re Bayou Hedge Funds Inv. Litig.,
No. 06 Civ. 3026 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2007).
70. Id.
71. Committee Complaint, supra note 23, at 37.
72. Cantrell, supra note 52.
73. Kouwe, supra note 28.
74. Complaint at 21, SEC v. WG Trading Investors, L.P., No. 09 Civ. 1750
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ostensibly a low risk strategy designed to outperform major market
indexes.75
Enhanced equity indexing is a broad term that describes various
low risk strategies designed to outperform traditional indexing.76
Westgate's approach consisted of two components.77 In the first phase,
Westgate would gain exposure to a stock index, such as the S&P 500,
through the purchase of S&P 500 index futures.78 In the second phase,
Westgate would execute an index arbitrage strategy 79 to lock in a cash
flow. Westgate accomplished this arbitrage by selling index futures
short and buying the underlying equities in the index or vice versa
depending on market conditions.80  The combination of Westgate's
futures position in the S&P 500 coupled with the arbitrage cash flow
produced an enhanced S&P 500 return.
From 1996 until their scheme unraveled in February 2009,
Westridge Capital and its affiliated entities raised over $667 million.81
Greenwood and Walsh invested only a fraction of this money, however,
in the enhanced equity indexing strategy.82 Instead, they treated
Westridge like their personal piggy-bank and misappropriated as much
as $554 million to fund their lavish lifestyles. 83 Indeed, Greenwood and
Walsh went on a spending spree: they bought luxury cars, multi-million
dollar homes, a horse farm, horses, and incredibly, an $80,000 teddy
bear collection.84  They effected their looting by simply instructing
employees to wire funds from Westridge to their personal accounts or in
some cases to third parties to cover personal expenses.85 Moreover, they
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009) [hereinafter WG Complaint].
75. Stecklow, supra note 3.
76. Indexing is a strategy where a manager builds a portfolio of securities to mimic
an index. FRANK K. REILLY, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 232
(1994). Enhanced indexing is considered a hybrid between active and passive
management and is used to describe any strategy that is used in conjunction with
indexing for the purpose of outperforming a specific benchmark. Investopedia.com,
Enhanced Indexing, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/enhanced-indexing.asp (last
visited Oct. 18, 2009).
77. WG Complaint, supra note 74, at 7.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id.
83. WG Complaint, supra note 74, at 2.
84. Kouwe, supra note 29.
85. WG Complaint, supra note 74, at 11.
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would annually sign "promissory notes" with no interest or maturity to
cover their withdrawals. 86 The scheme unraveled in February of 2009
during an audit by the National Futures Association ("NFA")87 when the
NFA discovered the notes and requested a meeting with Greenwood and
Walsh. They refused to cooperate and the NFA suspended their mem-
bership.88 As institutional investors learned of the suspension, requests
for withdrawals began and Westridge imploded.
Kim-The KL Group
(Disclosure & Looting)
When marketers of the KL Group would meet with investors, they
touted John Kim's history as a highly profitable Wall Street trader with a
sophisticated proprietary trading system.8 9 KL Group marketers would
lead prospective investors through the KL Group's luxurious offices in
the new Esperante building in downtown West Palm Beach, Florida.
These tours would culminate with a visit to the KL Group's trading
floor, 9° a technological marvel with large flat-panel televisions scattered
throughout. 9' There were hordes of traders on the phone and Kim, the
main attraction, frantically trading while surrounded by 20 computer
screens. 
92
Kim and the other two principals of the firm drove flashy cars, lived
lavish lifestyles and befriended the right people who introduced them to
wealthy Palm Beach clients. 93 Marketing materials boasted that the fund
achieved an annualized return in excess of 125% by investing in
aggressive growth stocks. 94 The purported success of the fund and its
aura of exclusivity had Palm Beach's elite begging to be let in the fund.
In fact, Kim had no Wall Street experience 95 and the fund had
86. Id. at 11-12.
87. The National Futures Association is a self-regulating organization for the
United States futures industry. See National Futures Association, www.nfa.futures.org
(last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
88. WG Complaint, supra note 74, at 33.
89. KL Complaint, supra note 26, at 7.
90. Julie Creswell, supra note 30.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. KL Complaint, supra note 26, at 8.
95. Id.
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sustained massive losses of approximately $81 million.96 The hordes of
traders who populated the floor were inexperienced and spent their days
trading inconsequential sums of money to give the appearance of a
legitimate trading floor.97 To conceal these losses, Kim and the two
other principals forged brokerage reports to fool the firm's independent
accountant.98 The accountant then generated account statements and
other performance disclosures that were given to investors to conceal the
losses. 99 Once the principals at KL Group realized that they could not
recoup their massive trading losses, two of them looted cash from the
fund and fled the U.S. '00 Both were eventually captured a few years
later and brought back to Palm Beach County for prosecution.'O'
Lauer-Lancer Management Group
(Disclosure & Inflated Valuations)
Michael Lauer was an established investment manager who raised
over $1.1 billion from wealthy individuals and large institutions for his
Lancer family of hedge funds. 02 His trading strategy, as he explained it,
focused on investments in small and mid-cap companies that Wall Street
had shown little or no interest in.'0 3 In fact, Lauer took advantage of
these stocks' illiquidity and inflated their prices through manipulative
trading. 0 4 Near the close of the last trading day of the month, Lauer
would buy blocks of these illiquid stocks at steadily increasing prices, to
raise their closing price.'0 5  In addition, Lauer purchased stocks in
privately held companies and gave them unjustified high prices based on
96. Id.
97. Creswell, supra note 30.
98. Id. at 30.
99. Id. at 32.
100. Jim Loney, Partner in $200 Million Fund Collapse Faces U.S. Court,
REUTERS, Apr. 3, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/rbsslnvestment
Services/idUSN0335514220090403.
101. Jason Schultz, Lawyer Pleads Guilty to Fraud, PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 17,
2009, at 6B.
102. Press Release, SEC, SEC Wins Major Hedge Fund Fraud Case Against
Michael Lauer, Head of Lancer Management Group (Sept. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-225.htm [hereinafter Lauer Press Release].
103. Complaint at 5, SEC v. Lauer, No. 03-80612 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2009)
[hereinafter Lauer Complaint].
104. Id. at 22.
105. Id.
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unrealistic projections. 10 6  The mismarking of assets allowed him to
claim a significantly higher NAV for his fund, translating into a highly
inflated fund performance. With his "phenomenal" trading, Lauer
reaped ten of millions in performance fees, attracted new investors and
ensured that his current investors stayed in the fund.'07 Lauer's mark-to-
market method even convinced his auditors, who certified Lauer's end
of year financial statements based on Lauer's lofty valuations. l' When
news that the SEC was investigating the fund surfaced, investors began
to request redemptions. Lauer was forced to sell overpriced, illiquid
assets, triggering massive losses. 0 9 Indeed, Lauer's fraud cost investors
an estimated $500 million. 110
Nicholson- Westgate
(Disclosure & Looting)
James Nicholson worked for years as a registered representative at
various broker-dealers. Following numerous customer complaints, he
was permanently barred from the industry by the NASD."' He then
founded Westgate Capital Management. l12 The fund's strategy was
touted as one that would exploit perceived anomalies in the prices of
equities (known as a long/short strategy). 3 The fund would buy stocks
that it perceived to be underpriced while selling stocks that it believed to
be overpriced so that it would achieve positive returns in all market
106. Id. at 17.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Lauer Complaint, supra note 103, at 34.
109. Fund Manager Liable for Fraud, WALL ST. J., Sept 25, 2008, at C12; Ann
Logue, Lancer Management Group-Penny Stocks (Fraudulent), Hedgefund Implode-
O-Meter, http://hf-implode.com/imploded/fundLancerManagementGroup_2003-07.
html (last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
110. Lauer Press Release, supra note 102.
111. Nicholson Complaint, supra note 25, at 6 (James Nicholson was permanently
barred as a registered representative of the National Association of Securities Dealers in
2001.).
112. Id. at 7.
113. Long/short involves creating a portfolio that consists of buying equities that are
expected to increase in value and selling equities that are expected to decrease in value.
No matter what happens in the overall market, as long as the spread between the
purchased and sold equities is favorable, the fund profits. PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 10, at 1 1-12.
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conditions. 114 With alleged steady positive returns in all months, leading
to annual returns in the vicinity of 20%, he was able to raise
approximately $294 million from investors.115 Nicholson's trading
strategy might have initially been effective but eventually he started to
lose money. 1 6 However, he disclosed to investors that his fund was
profitable. He then stole the identity of accountant Ron Havener and set
up a fictitious accounting firm named Havener & Havener (with a
prestigious Manhattan address"7) to audit the fund." 8 The accounting
firm provided investors with audited financials to corroborate
Westgate's fictitious disclosures. 9 His scheme dissolved as news of
Bernard Madoff's arrest, 20 coupled with the stock market's collapse,
scared investors. Soon, requests for withdrawals mounted.' 2'
Redemption checks bounced and shortly thereafter regulators were
knocking at his door. 2 2  The fraud cost investors at least $150
million. 123
Nadel-Scoop
(Disclosure & Looting)
According to his fund marketing documents, Arthur Nadel
graduated from New York University Law School and was a prominent
real estate developer during the 1960s.124 These documents failed to
disclose, however, that Nadel was disbarred in 1982 for taking $50,000
114. Nicholson Complaint, supra note 25, at 25.
115. Id. at 26-29; Andrew Tangel et al., Investors Say Charm Lured Them into Ruin,
RECORD, July 19, 2009, at AOl.
116. Nicholson Complaint, supra note 25, at 27.
117. Id. at 37 (Nicholson personally set up this front at 49 East 41st Street, New
York, New York through a virtual office arrangement, using his own telephone
numbers and driver's license.).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. SEC, Litigation Release No. 20889, Defendant Bernard L. Madoff Consents to
Partial Judgment Imposing Permanent Injunction and Continuing Other Relief (Feb. 9,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/Ir20889.htm
(complaint alleges that Bernard Madoff committed a $50 billion fraud).
121. Nicholson Complaint, supra note 26, at 38-42.
122. Id.
123. Chad Bray, Two Indicted on Charges Tied to Fraud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24,
2009, at C3.
124. Complaint at 1, SEC v. Nadel, No. 09-00087 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2009)
[hereinafter Nadel Complaint].
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out of an escrow account to pay off loan sharks. 125
In 2001, Nadel opened an investment management company that
eventually advised six hedge funds. 126 His stated trading strategy was to
input extensive fundamental equity research into a proprietary
computerized trading system. 127 With the strong trading record alleg-
edly produced by his "black box," he raised $397 million over time from
gullible investors. '2 8 Unfortunately, there was no trading because Nadel
ran a Ponzi scheme. Nadel used new cash entering his funds to pay
previous investors, or simply transferred the money to his secret
personal bank accounts. 129  When the SEC began to investigate his
funds, he provided investigators false financials showing assets in excess
of $300 million. 30 A few months later, when the SEC filed an
emergency action against Nadel, it found less than $1 million in the
firm's accounts. 131
III. DISCLOSURE VS. THIRD PARTY OVERSIGHT
Disclosure is the foundation of the federal securities laws in the
United States. 132  In response to the stock market crash of 1929,
Congress enacted laws designed to protect current and potential
investors. The Securities Act of 1933 (the "'33 Act") governs the regis-
tration and sale of securities and related disclosure requirements. The
'33 Act requires issuers to disclose significant information about
themselves and the terms of the securities they are issuing.' 33  The
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the "'34 Act") regulates
secondary markets and many market participants. It requires the Regis-
125. Debra Cassens Weiss, Latest Missing Money Manager Was a Disbarred
Lawyer, A.B.A. J., Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.abajoumal.com/news/
latest missing moneymanager was a-disbarredlawyer.
126. Nadel Complaint, supra note 124, at 1.
127. Michael Pollick, Nadel Denies SEC Allegations, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB.,
Apr. 7, 2009, at DOI.
128. Id.
129. Nadel Complaint, supra note 124, at 5.
130. Id. at 36-38.
131. Id.
132. Interview with James Jalil, supra note 4; see also SEC, The Laws That Govern
the Securities Industry, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Oct. 17,
2009).
133. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2006).
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tration of all securities that are to be traded on a securities exchange and
detailed disclosures regarding both the company and the registered
security. 134  In addition to the initial registration, the '34 Act also
requires publicly traded companies to report certain material information
to the public periodically. 35 Similarly, under the Investment Company
Act of 1940, investment companies subject to the Act must register with
the SEC, which imposes disclosure requirements and some direct
regulation. 136  These laws are supposed to allow investors to make
informed decisions based on full and complete disclosure by issuers and
publicly traded companies.
The reasoning supporting these acts is clear: disclosure discourages
misconduct. As Justice Louis Brandeis famously wrote, "sunlight is the
best disinfectant." '37  With this legislative history of registration and
disclosure, it is logical that politicians now believe that disclosure is the
solution to hedge fund fraud. As Senator Chuck Grassley stated, it is
time to "shed some sunlight on [hedge funds] to see what they're up
to."
138
If only it were so easy. As the frauds discussed above demonstrate,
even sophisticated parties 39 can be fooled. For this reason, it is unlikely
that disclosure will sufficiently prevent hedge fund fraud in the future.
A. Why Disclosure Will Not Work
An investment adviser registers with the SEC by filing a document
called Form ADV.140 Part 1 of the form requires disclosure of infor-
mation pertaining to the adviser. 1 4' It includes the adviser's education,
business and disciplinary history within the last ten years, address,
phone number, number of employees, types of clients, assets under
134. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2006).
135. Id.
136. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80al-80a64 (2006).
137. Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Securities Act of 1933,
http://www.sifma.org/legislative/secexchangeact of 1933.html (last visited Oct. 17,
2009).
138. Press Release, Office of Sen. Grassley, supra note 2.
139. In both the Westridge Capital and Lancer cases, institutional investors were
fooled. See generally supra text Part II.B, II.D.
140. SEC, Form ADV, http://www.sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm (last visited Oct.
17, 2009).
141. Id.
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management, ownership information, and key executives. 42 Part 1 is
filed electronically with the SEC. 143 Investors can find a copy of an
investment adviser's most recent Part 1 on the Investment Adviser
Public Disclosure Web site.'44 Part 2 is a narrative document that in-
cludes additional information such as an adviser's services, fees,
business practices and investment strategies. 145 The adviser is required
to maintain and deliver Part 2 to clients and prospective clients. 1
46
This Note discussed the numerous ways that hedge fund managers
can manipulate disclosure: blatant lying to investors and auditors, 147 the
creation of fictitious accounting firms to audit financials, 148 identity theft
and forged audited financials, 149 forged trading documents provided to
legitimate auditors, 50 and fanciful valuations of private companies and
illiquid stocks."'5 Any hedge fund manager engaging in these activities
would undoubtedly provide the SEC and investors with a false or
misleading Form ADV. 152  Moreover, can the SEC, with its current
manpower, even effectively review the accuracy of Form ADV of over
8000 hedge funds? 1
53
Some fraudsters were registered as investment advisers with the
SEC. That did not stop them from perpetrating their fraud. For ex-
ample, the managers at Westridge Capital Management, a registered
investment adviser, made fictitious disclosures and looted as much as
$554 million from their fund. 154 Madoff registered Bernard L. Madoff
Securities LLC as an investment adviser with the SEC in 2006,155 yet
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. SEC, Investment Adviser Public Disclosure, http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/
IAPD/Content/lapdMain/iapdSiteMap.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
145. See SEC, Form ADV, supra note 140.
146. Id.
147. See supra Part II.B.
148. See supra Part II.A.
149. See supra Part II.E.
150. See supra Part II.C.
151. See supra Part II.D.
152. See SEC, Form ADV, supra note 140.
153. Press Release, Hedge Fund Research Inc., Record Number of Hedge Funds
Liquidate in 2008 (Mar. 18, 2009), available at https://www.hedgefundresearch.con/
pdf/pr 20090318.pdf.
154. See supra text Part II.B.
155. Transcript of Guilty Plea at 10-13, United States v. Madoff, No. 09 CR 213
(S.D.N.Y Mar. 12, 2009).
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still continued to perpetrate the largest investor fraud ever committed by
a single person. R. Allen Stanford orchestrated an $8 billion fraud
through Stanford Capital Management, a registered investment
adviser. 15 6 This suggests not only that registration was ineffective, but
also that it might actually help perpetrate the fraud. Investors might
assume a registered hedge fund has an implicit SEC approval. This
could make it easier for an unscrupulous manager who intends to run a
Ponzi scheme to raise funds.
Similarly, despite extensive disclosure requirements for public
companies, 5 7 vigorously enforced by the SEC, the U.S. has still
experienced a series of disclosure-based scandals'58 in the last decade
from major corporations such as WorldCom,' 59 Tyco International, 160
Global Crossing,' 6' Adelphia Communications16  and, of course,
156. Amended Complaint at 1, SEC v. Stanford Int'l Bank, Ltd., No. 09-0298 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 17, 2009) (Stanford and Davis executed a massive Ponzi scheme through
entities under their control, including Stanford International Bank, Stanford Group
Company, a broker dealer, and Stanford Capital Management, an investment adviser.).
157. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2006).
158. Ohio Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Fannie Mae, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1030
(S.D. Ohio 2005) (2004 accounting scandal at Fannie Mae); United States v. Brown,
338 F. Supp. 2d 552, 557-59 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (2002 accounting scandal); SEC,
Litigation Release No. 21090, SEC Sues Comverse Technology, Inc. for Fraudulent
Options Backdating and Earning Management Schemes (June 18, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21090.htm; Press Release, Fed. Bureau
of Investigation, San Diego, Peregrine's Former European Vice President Pleads Guilty
to Wire Fraud (Jan. 26, 2009), available at http://sandiego.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/
pressrel09/sd012609.htm (2002 accounting scandal); SEC, Litigation Release No.
20836, SEC Files Settled Enforcement Actions Against UnitedHealth Group Inc. and
Former General Counsel in Stock Options Backdating Case (Dec. 22, 2008), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20836.htm; SEC, Litigation Release
No. 20717, SEC Announces $7.2 Million Settlement With Former KB Home Chairman
and CEO for Stock Option Backdating and Self-Dealing (Sept. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20717.htm (CEO of KB Homes charged
with backdating of options); Chris Noon, RadioShack's Edmonson Apologizes for
Resume Flubs, FORBES.COM, Feb. 16, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/2006/02/16/
radioshack-edmonson-resume-cx cn0216autofacescan I l.html (RadioShack's CEO
apologizes over misstatements on r~sumd); David Voreacos, Rite Aid Ex-Counsel
Brown, 76, Wins Delay of JO-Year Jail Term, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 6, 2004,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=aFNt8rGBWhe0&refer=us
(Executives at Rite Aid Corporation were convicted of inflating earnings at Rite Aid.
The fraud led the company to erase $1.6 billion in profit.).
159. SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
160. In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd., 535 F. Supp. 2d 249, 252 (D.N.H. 2007).
161. In re Global Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 441 (S.D.N.Y.
2009
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Enron. 163  Some of these frauds have been so extensive that, when
discovered, drove those companies into bankruptcy. 64 For example,
WorldCom filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection soon after
disclosing that Scott D. Sullivan, its Chief Financial Officer,
implemented a strategy that improperly accounted for $3.85 billion of
expenses.165 If the extensive disclosure requirements of the '33 and '34
Acts have not prevented executives from manipulating financial
statements so that they could reap the benefits of their stock options
grants, such measures are unlikely to be effective for hedge funds. 1
66
Finally, registration will not prevent a dishonest manager from
becoming a looter. Once the principals at KL Group realized that they
could not recoup their massive trading losses, two of the principals
looted cash from the fund and fled the U.S. 167  This type of looting
would not be prevented by disclosure.
B. Independent Third Parties as a Solution to Hedge Fund Fraud
A better way to minimize fraud risk would be to amend the U.S.
Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "'40 Act"). The '40 Act defines
investment companies and places them under the regulatory oversight of
the SEC. 68  The '40 Act focuses on disclosure about funds and their
investment objectives, as well as on investment companies' structure
2004).
162. In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 285 B.R. 580, 586 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
163. Newby v. Lay, 258 F. Supp. 2d 576, 611 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (accounting fraud in
2001).
164. See Todd R. Weiss, Troubled Peregrine Files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
COMPUTER WORLD, Sept. 23, 2002, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/74473/
TroubledPeregrine files for Chapter_ 11_bankruptcy (stating that an accounting
scandal forced Peregrine into bankruptcy and resulted in criminal indictments for I 1
senior managers); see also Simon Romero, WorldCom's Collapse: The Overview;
WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at Al
(stating that on July 21, 2002, WorldCom filed for Chapter 1I bankruptcy protection in
the largest such filing in United States history).
165. Romero, supra note 164.
166. Hedge fund managers receive a performance fee (usually 20%) based on the
hedge fund's annual returns. FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 2, at 161. Therefore they
have similar incentives as corporate executives have to inflate their earnings.
167. Loney, supra note 100.
168. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80al-80a64 (2006).
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and operations. 6 9  Compliance with the '40 Act's provisions is
burdensome. 170 The most common exemptions (to the definition of an
investment company) are found in Sections 3(c)(1)171 and 3(c)(7) 172 of
the '40 Act. These exemptions are most commonly used by hedge funds
to escape SEC oversight.
Any hedge fund seeking to utilize Section 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7)
exemptions of the '40 Act 173 should be required to place its securities
and similar investments in the custody of an independent third party
once the fund exceeds a certain threshold dollar amount. 74  The
custodian, known as a fund administrator in the hedge fund industry,"75
would be mandated by the revised Act to perform several duties
intended to safeguard investors' assets.
1. Disclosure Duties
Under my proposal, the hedge fund administrator would maintain
the fund's financial books and records, calculate the fund's NAV, and
provide monthly reports directly to the investors without input from the
adviser. The hedge fund would still choose the broker to execute trades,
but this choice would be subject to a veto by the fund administrator. 176
Copies of all trade confirmations would be sent to the fund administrator
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. (The section 3(c)(1) exemption is based on the number of investors,
"Any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially
owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making and does not
presently propose to make a public offering of its securities.").
172. See id. (The section 3(c)(7) exemption is based on wealthy investors, "[a]ny
issuer, the outstanding securities of which are owned exclusively by persons who, at the
time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers, and which is not making
and does not at that time propose to make a public offering of such securities." A
qualified investor is defined in Section 2(51), as natural persons with $5 million in
investments, or persons that control $25 million.).
173. See id. (By utilizing these exemptions, a hedge fund does not fall under the
definition of an investment company and therefore need not register as an investment
company and consequently follow the extensive regulations associated with it.).
174. The intent of the threshold is to keep the sector vibrant by not imposing high
custody costs on new hedge funds.
175. FundAdministrator.org, Fund Administration Definition, http://fund
administration.org/fund-administrator-definition/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
176. The fund administrator could veto the broker for a conflict of interest. For
example, an administrator may veto a broker if the broker was owned or controlled by
the manager, received most of the trades of the fund, or charged high commissions.
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in order to perform daily and monthly reconciliations between the broker
and manager. The fund administrator would prepare the semi-annual
and annual financials and have the sole responsibility to hire the fund's
independent auditor. The qualifications of the auditor would be as
stringent as those used for registered investment companies. 177  My
proposal would also require the auditor to deliver the fund's audited
financials to investors within a reasonable time frame. This would be
defined as within 60 days of the end of their fiscal year (the time frame
required for registered investment companies). '78
2. Anti-Looting Duties
Under my proposal, hedge fund investors would send their cash
directly to the bank account set up by the fund administrator, rather than
to the hedge fund manager or to any accounts controlled by him. The
fund administrator would have sole and absolute control of this account.
The hedge fund manager would have no ability to withdraw cash from
177. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 9, at 57-59.
The qualifications of an independent accountant that may be used by a hedge fund are
not as stringent as those used for registered investment companies. A hedge fund's
independent accountant must comply with the general independence standards of the
AICPA or of the individual State Boards of Accountancy where the independent
accountant practices. In contrast, a registered investment company independent
accountant must comply with the requirements of the Investment Company Act of
1940 and is required to follow certain regulations established under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 and various Commission rules to ensure the independence of
auditors. In addition, a hedge fund's independent accountant is not required to register
with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") unless if it also
serves as the independent auditor for a public company. A hedge fund's independent
auditor is not otherwise required to register with PCAOB, nor are its audits with
respect to private issuers subject to PCAOB examination. As a result, the audits of
hedge fund financial statements will not be subject to the examination process of the
PCAOB in its oversight of registered accounting firms.
Id.
178. Registered investment companies must transmit to shareholders audited
financial statements within 60 days of their fiscal year end. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.30e-
l(c) (2009). See IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 9, at 58
("There are no time constraints on delivering the hedge fund's audited financial
statements to investors unless specifically stated in the PPM or partnership
agreement."). But see 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2009) (A registered investment
adviser with custody of client assets is required to provide all limited partners or
beneficial owners of the hedge fund with audited financial statements within 120 days
in certain circumstances.).
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the account. The manager's monthly management fee, and annual
performance fee would be calculated by the fund administrator and sent
to the manager. Clients wishing to redeem would have to contact both
the hedge fund manager and the fund administrator, who would then
coordinate to send them the cash. In essence, the hedge fund manager
would only have trading authority in the fund that he was advising. The
fund administrator would handle all other administrative details dealing
with cash flows (such as payment of the fund's expenses).
3. Preventing Inflated Valuations of Assets
The fund administrator would be responsible for pricing the
securities in the fund. For thinly traded (illiquid) assets, the fund
administrator would not accept the end of month closing price as the
value for the asset, especially if it significantly deviates from the average
value for that month. When pricing these assets the fund administrator
would be mandated to take a conservative approach that would take into
account factors such as the size of the hedge fund's position in that asset
versus its daily trading volume. For the pricing of assets in private
companies and other hard-to-price securities that are beyond the ability
of the fund administrator to price, independent third parties should be
utilized.
In all cases, where a hedge fund's portfolio contains assets that are
illiquid, privately held, or otherwise hard to price (e.g., structure
products, exotic derivatives), the fund administrator would have to
disclose this information (in a prominent fashion), along with associated
risks on the periodic reports to investors.
4. Preventing Conflicts of Interest
Not all conflicts of interest would be eliminated through the fund
administrator mechanism. The fund administrator realistically would be
unable to limit the risk that the fund was taking other than ensuring that
purchases of assets were in compliance with the fund's stated objectives
in terms of both leverage and asset class. In other areas the fund
administrator could be more effective.
The fund administrator would have the authority to request
disclosure of broker accounts owned or controlled by the manager (and
other principals) and receive monthly copies of statements. The fund
administrator's compliance department would monitor these accounts
3532009
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for front-running. 17
9
All trades would clear through the fund administrator. This would
enable the fund administrator's compliance department to monitor for
unusually high broker commissions paid to brokers, and for excessive
trading designed to produce commissions. o
Trades between funds, trades to be allocated to multiple funds, or
aggregation of a trade destined for multiple funds would be flagged and
sent to the fund administrator's compliance department for review. The
compliance department would determine if any conflicts of interest were
present and would discuss the issue with the manager. In the event the
fund administrator determined there was a conflict of interest, it would
have the authority to re-price the trade (for cross-trading)' 8' or split up
the trade equally among funds (for aggregation and allocation issues). 182
If the broker used to execute trades was owned or affiliated with the
hedge fund manager (or other fund principals), the fund administrator
would disclose this information on the periodic reports to investors.
The fund administrator would also be required to have a "noisy
withdrawal" rule. In the event that the fund administrator terminated its
duties with a fund it would be required to give its reason to the SEC.
IV. POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH THIRD PARTY CUSTODIANS
Hiring a fund administrator is a significant expense for a hedge
fund. Fees charged by administrators are based on a variety of factors
including, number of investors, types of assets in the fund, transaction
volume and frequency of investor reports. '83 A typical fee charged to a
hedge fund manager is 18 basis points per annum, on assets under
management. 184 For example, a $100 million fund would pay an annual
179. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
181. See Press Release, Office of Sen. Grassley, supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
182. See Investopedia.com, supra note 42; see also supra text accompanying notes
42-43; In re Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1387, 51
S.E.C. 715 (Oct. 20, 1993).
183. UBS Global Asset Mgmt., Product Range by Location, http://www.ubs.com/
1/e/globalam/fundservices/product range_location.html#_ams (last visited Oct. 17,
2009).
184. See Interview with John C. Liu, supra note 15 (Fees charged to hedge funds for
fund administration range from 11 to 18 bps per annum calculated on assets under
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fee of $180,000. The envisioned added responsibilities of the adminis-
trator, however, would most likely cause them to increase their fees.
This could lead to strenuous objections from hedge fund lobbyists to any
proposed custodian legislation.
In fact, there are several reasons why mandating third party
administrators would benefit hedge fund managers. The manager would
no longer have to invest in technology and hire personnel to perform
back-office and accounting services (as these functions would be dealt
with by the fund administrator). Outsourcing functions could therefore
be a source of net savings for the manager. Moreover, since the hedge
fund manager's primary role is to effectively execute the fund's trading
strategy to generate optimal returns, outsourcing these administrative
functions would allow managers to focus on their core job: trading
assets.
Typically, administrative services are charged to investors as a fund
expense.1 85 In the post-Madoff environment, a rational investor should
have no problems paying added expenses to ensure that their investment
is secure from most frauds. In addition, having a third party admin-
istrator is likely to boost investor confidence in hedge funds, potentially
increasing cash inflows. 186
V. CONCLUSION
Disclosure is the foundation of the federal securities laws in the
United States.187 Yet despite rigorous disclosure requirements 188 in_
vestors have been exposed to significant corporate fraud in the last
decade. 189  Recognizing the limitations of disclosure, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act ("SOX") was signed into law in 2002. The Act mandated a
number of reforms and created the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") to oversee the activities of the auditing
management. Typically fees decrease as the amount of assets under management
increases. In addition, startup funds typically get big breaks on fees.).
185. Ivy Schmerken, What Is a Fund Administrator?, ADVANCED TRADING, Jan. 29,
2009, http://www.advancedtrading.com/regulations/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=212
903181.
186. Id. (After getting caught up in the Madoff scandal and losing millions of
dollars, institutional investors are putting pressure on hedge funds to hire third-party
fund administrators.).
187. See SEC, Laws That Govern the Security Industry, supra note 132.
188. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
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profession.
Dishonest managers who have perpetrated some of the outrageous
frauds listed in this article would hardly have been deterred simply
because they were registered with the SEC. 190 There have been a few
examples of registered investment advisers that have perpetrated
fraud.191 In addition, SEC registration might even give investors a false
sense of security, thus helping managers who want to commit fraud.
A custody arrangement with an independent third party can prevent
many of the frauds discussed in this article. If fighting fraud is the intent
of our legislators then a better solution would be the custody of hedge
fund assets with an independent third party.
190. See Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2876 (May 14, 2009) (The SEC recognizes the
limitations of disclosure. On May 14, 2009, the SEC released a set of proposed rules
that includes: adviser to obtain an SAS-70 report from a PCAOB registered and
inspected accountant if he holds custody of assets, surprise asset verification exams by
an independent public accountant, notification by the accountant of termination of its
engagement to the Commission and direct delivery of custodial statements to advisory
clients.).
191. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
